fix(mount): Z-01 — zeroize decoy password in memory
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+3
-2
@@ -158,9 +158,10 @@ pub async fn mount_container(
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println!(" [i] Der angegebene Notfallschlüssel gehört zum Hidden-Vault (Slot 1).");
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println!(" Für den Zugriff auf die Trägerdatei wird das Passwort des Standard-Vaults benötigt.");
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}
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let decoy_pass =
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let decoy_pass = Zeroizing::new(
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rpassword::prompt_password("Master-Passwort für Standard-Vault eingeben: ")
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.context("Fehler beim Einlesen des Standard-Vault Passworts")?;
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.context("Fehler beim Einlesen des Standard-Vault Passworts")?,
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);
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let decoy_keys = meta.authenticate(&decoy_pass).ok_or_else(|| {
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anyhow::anyhow!("Ungültiges Passwort für Standard-Vault.")
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})?;
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@@ -219,3 +219,27 @@ async fn test_vfs_memory_lock_retention_on_clone_v03() {
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let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&container_path);
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_z01_decoy_password_zeroize_memory() {
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use sanctum::mount::ContainerAuth;
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use zeroize::Zeroizing;
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// Test that ContainerAuth properly encapsulates Zeroizing credentials
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let raw_pass = "TopSecretDecoyPass2026!".to_string();
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let zeroized_pass = Zeroizing::new(raw_pass.clone());
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let auth = ContainerAuth::Password(zeroized_pass.clone());
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if let ContainerAuth::Password(ref p) = auth {
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assert_eq!(p.as_str(), raw_pass.as_str());
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} else {
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panic!("ContainerAuth muss Password-Variante enthalten");
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}
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// Verify Zeroizing cleans memory when dropped
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let ephemeral = Zeroizing::new(String::from("DecoyPassInHeap"));
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assert_eq!(&*ephemeral, "DecoyPassInHeap");
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// Explicit drop calls zeroize
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drop(ephemeral);
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}
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