chore(qa): format code and configure clippy lints

Cargo.toml

@@ -55,3 +55,17 @@ codegen-units = 1
 panic = "unwind"
 strip = true
 overflow-checks = true
+
+[lints.clippy]
+too_many_arguments = "allow"
+type_complexity = "allow"
+field_reassign_with_default = "allow"
+upper_case_acronyms = "allow"
+collapsible_if = "allow"
+manual_dangling_ptr = "allow"
+needless_borrow = "allow"
+manual_strip = "allow"
+redundant_pattern_matching = "allow"
+needless_range_loop = "allow"
+manual_range_contains = "allow"
+

src/carrier.rs

@@ -934,7 +934,8 @@ impl DavFileSystem for CarrierFs {
         Box::pin(async move {
             self.touch();
             let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
-            let total_capacity = inner.manifest.total_blocks as u64 * crate::crypto::CHUNK_SIZE as u64;
+            let total_capacity =
+                inner.manifest.total_blocks as u64 * crate::crypto::CHUNK_SIZE as u64;
             let used_bytes = inner
                 .manifest
                 .inodes
@@ -1122,7 +1123,8 @@ impl DavFile for CarrierFile {
                 let target = self.cursor;
                 while self.file_size < target {
                     let block_idx = (self.file_size / CARRIER_BLOCK_PAYLOAD_SIZE as u64) as usize;
-                    let offset_in_block = (self.file_size % CARRIER_BLOCK_PAYLOAD_SIZE as u64) as usize;
+                    let offset_in_block =
+                        (self.file_size % CARRIER_BLOCK_PAYLOAD_SIZE as u64) as usize;
                     let space_in_block = CARRIER_BLOCK_PAYLOAD_SIZE - offset_in_block;
                     let to_pad = ((target - self.file_size) as usize).min(space_in_block);
 

src/crypto.rs

@@ -590,13 +590,13 @@ pub fn hmac_sha256(key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
     }
 
     let mut inner_hasher = Sha256::new();
-    inner_hasher.update(&k_ipad);
+    inner_hasher.update(k_ipad);
     inner_hasher.update(data);
     let inner_hash = inner_hasher.finalize();
 
     let mut outer_hasher = Sha256::new();
-    outer_hasher.update(&k_opad);
+    outer_hasher.update(k_opad);
-    outer_hasher.update(&inner_hash);
+    outer_hasher.update(inner_hash);
     let out = outer_hasher.finalize();
 
     let mut result = [0u8; 32];
@@ -840,8 +840,14 @@ mod tests {
             256 * 1024,
             "Default memory cost must be 256 MiB (262,144 KiB)"
         );
-        assert_eq!(defaults.time_cost, 4, "Default time cost must be 4 iterations");
+        assert_eq!(
-        assert_eq!(defaults.parallelism, 4, "Default parallelism must be 4 threads");
+            defaults.time_cost, 4,
+            "Default time cost must be 4 iterations"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            defaults.parallelism, 4,
+            "Default parallelism must be 4 threads"
+        );
         assert!(
             validate_kdf_params(&defaults).is_ok(),
             "Default KDF parameters must pass validation"
@@ -923,8 +929,15 @@ mod tests {
         let chunk_index = 0u32;
 
         // 1. Chunk mit Generation 1 verschlüsseln
-        let (ct1, nonce1, tag1) =
+        let (ct1, nonce1, tag1) = encrypt_chunk(
-            encrypt_chunk(&dek, node_id, chunk_index, plaintext_v1, FORMAT_VERSION_V3, 1).unwrap();
+            &dek,
+            node_id,
+            chunk_index,
+            plaintext_v1,
+            FORMAT_VERSION_V3,
+            1,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
 
         // Verifiziere reguläre Entschlüsselung mit Generation 1
         let dec1 = decrypt_chunk(
@@ -957,8 +970,15 @@ mod tests {
         );
 
         // 3. Chunk überschreiben mit Generation 2
-        let (ct2, nonce2, tag2) =
+        let (ct2, nonce2, tag2) = encrypt_chunk(
-            encrypt_chunk(&dek, node_id, chunk_index, plaintext_v2, FORMAT_VERSION_V3, 2).unwrap();
+            &dek,
+            node_id,
+            chunk_index,
+            plaintext_v2,
+            FORMAT_VERSION_V3,
+            2,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
         let dec2 = decrypt_chunk(
             &dek,
             node_id,
@@ -983,11 +1003,21 @@ mod tests {
             FORMAT_VERSION_V3,
             2,
         );
-        assert!(attack_res.is_err(), "Replay von altem Ciphertext muss abgewehrt werden");
+        assert!(
+            attack_res.is_err(),
+            "Replay von altem Ciphertext muss abgewehrt werden"
+        );
 
         // 5. Abwärtskompatibilität: In V2 wird generation ignoriert
-        let (ct_v2, nonce_v2, tag_v2) =
+        let (ct_v2, nonce_v2, tag_v2) = encrypt_chunk(
-            encrypt_chunk(&dek, node_id, chunk_index, plaintext_v1, FORMAT_VERSION_V2, 0).unwrap();
+            &dek,
+            node_id,
+            chunk_index,
+            plaintext_v1,
+            FORMAT_VERSION_V2,
+            0,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
         let dec_v2 = decrypt_chunk(
             &dek,
             node_id,
@@ -1043,7 +1073,8 @@ mod tests {
         let mut random_bytes = vec![0u8; 1000];
         OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut random_bytes);
 
-        let (ct, nonce, tag) = encrypt_chunk(&dek, 1, 0, &random_bytes, FORMAT_VERSION_V2, 0).unwrap();
+        let (ct, nonce, tag) =
+            encrypt_chunk(&dek, 1, 0, &random_bytes, FORMAT_VERSION_V2, 0).unwrap();
         // Da Kompression keine 64 Bytes spart, wird COMPRESSION_NONE (1 Byte) + Plaintext gespeichert
         assert_eq!(ct.len(), random_bytes.len() + 1);
 
@@ -1353,7 +1384,12 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(verify_metadata_mac(&mac_key, gen, canonical_nodes, &mac));
 
         // Manipulierte Generation -> ungültig
-        assert!(!verify_metadata_mac(&mac_key, gen + 1, canonical_nodes, &mac));
+        assert!(!verify_metadata_mac(
+            &mac_key,
+            gen + 1,
+            canonical_nodes,
+            &mac
+        ));
 
         // Manipulierte Knoten-Bytes -> ungültig
         assert!(!verify_metadata_mac(&mac_key, gen, b"tampered_nodes", &mac));

src/mount.rs

@@ -1006,16 +1006,14 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn test_m03_format_linux_mount_instructions() {
         let token = "fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210";
-        let instructions = format_linux_mount_instructions(
+        let instructions =
-            8443,
+            format_linux_mount_instructions(8443, token, Some(std::path::Path::new("/mnt/secure")));
-            token,
-            Some(std::path::Path::new("/mnt/secure")),
-        );
 
         let all_text = instructions.join("\n");
         assert!(all_text.contains("Benutzer: sanctum"));
         assert!(all_text.contains(token));
         assert!(all_text.contains("gio mount dav://sanctum@127.0.0.1:8443/"));
-        assert!(all_text.contains("mount -t davfs -o username=sanctum http://127.0.0.1:8443/ /mnt/secure"));
+        assert!(all_text
+            .contains("mount -t davfs -o username=sanctum http://127.0.0.1:8443/ /mnt/secure"));
     }
 }

src/storage.rs

@@ -396,7 +396,10 @@ impl Database {
 
     /// Setzt den aktiven Slot und DEK für automatische Metadaten-Authentifizierung (K-01).
     pub fn set_active_slot_and_dek(&self, slot_id: u32, dek: Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>) {
-        *self.active_session.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()) = Some((slot_id, dek));
+        *self
+            .active_session
+            .lock()
+            .unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()) = Some((slot_id, dek));
     }
 
     /// Gibt den aktuellen aktiven DEK zurück, falls gesetzt.
@@ -2046,7 +2049,11 @@ impl Database {
 
     /// Aktualisiert den Metadaten-MAC des aktiven Slots bei strukturellen Modifikationen (Format V3 / K-01).
     pub fn update_metadata_mac(&self) -> Result<()> {
-        let session_opt = self.active_session.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()).clone();
+        let session_opt = self
+            .active_session
+            .lock()
+            .unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())
+            .clone();
         let Some((slot_id, dek)) = session_opt else {
             return Ok(());
         };
@@ -2664,7 +2671,10 @@ mod tests {
         db.truncate_chunks_after(file.id, 0).unwrap();
 
         // Chunk 0 muss unberührt geblieben sein
-        let c0 = db.read_chunk(file.id, 0).unwrap().expect("Chunk 0 survives");
+        let c0 = db
+            .read_chunk(file.id, 0)
+            .unwrap()
+            .expect("Chunk 0 survives");
         assert_eq!(c0.ciphertext, payload_0);
 
         // Chunks 1 und 2 müssen gelöscht sein
@@ -2884,7 +2894,10 @@ mod tests {
             panic!("Simulierter Crash im Worker-Thread während aktiver SQLite-Verbindung");
         });
         let res = handle.join();
-        assert!(res.is_err(), "Worker-Thread muss wie erwartet gepanict haben");
+        assert!(
+            res.is_err(),
+            "Worker-Thread muss wie erwartet gepanict haben"
+        );
 
         // 3. Mutex ist nun poisoned. Ohne Z-02 schlägt jeder nachfolgende Aufruf fehl.
         // Mit Z-02 fängt unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()) das Poisoning ab:
@@ -2911,4 +2924,3 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(read_dek.unwrap()[0], 42);
     }
 }
-

src/sync.rs

@@ -240,7 +240,8 @@ pub fn is_excluded(name: &str, rel_path: &str, patterns: &[String]) -> bool {
                 return true;
             }
             // Wenn p_clean ein Verzeichnis ohne Wildcards ist, auch alle Unterpfade erfassen
-            if !p_clean.contains('*') && !p_clean.contains('?')
+            if !p_clean.contains('*')
+                && !p_clean.contains('?')
                 && (norm_rel == p_clean || norm_rel.starts_with(&format!("{}/", p_clean)))
             {
                 return true;

src/upgrade.rs

@@ -87,9 +87,7 @@ pub fn validate_trusted_comment_version(
     trusted_comment: &str,
     expected_release: &str,
 ) -> Result<()> {
-    let clean_expected = expected_release
+    let clean_expected = expected_release.trim().trim_start_matches(['v', 'V']);
-        .trim()
-        .trim_start_matches(|c| c == 'v' || c == 'V');
 
     if clean_expected.is_empty() {
         bail!("Erwartetes Release-Tag darf nicht leer sein.");
@@ -107,7 +105,7 @@ pub fn validate_trusted_comment_version(
             token
         };
 
-        let clean_val = val.trim_start_matches(|c| c == 'v' || c == 'V');
+        let clean_val = val.trim_start_matches(['v', 'V']);
         clean_val == clean_expected
     });
 
@@ -259,7 +257,7 @@ pub fn parse_checksum_for_asset(sha256sums_content: &str, target_asset: &str) ->
 
 /// Bereinigt einen Versionsstring von führenden 'v' / 'V' Zeichen und parst ihn als SemVer.
 pub fn parse_clean_version(ver_str: &str) -> Result<Version> {
-    let clean = ver_str.trim().trim_start_matches(|c| c == 'v' || c == 'V');
+    let clean = ver_str.trim().trim_start_matches(['v', 'V']);
     Version::parse(clean).with_context(|| format!("Ungültiges SemVer-Format: '{}'", ver_str))
 }
 

src/verify.rs

@@ -4,9 +4,7 @@ use std::path::Path;
 use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
 use zeroize::Zeroizing;
 
-use crate::crypto::{
+use crate::crypto::{decrypt_chunk, FORMAT_VERSION_V1, FORMAT_VERSION_V2, FORMAT_VERSION_V3};
-    decrypt_chunk, FORMAT_VERSION_V1, FORMAT_VERSION_V2, FORMAT_VERSION_V3,
-};
 use crate::storage::Database;
 
 /// Bericht über das Ergebnis einer Container-Integritätsprüfung.
@@ -264,7 +262,9 @@ pub fn verify_container(
                         );
                     }
                     Err(e) => {
-                        report.errors.push(format!("Fehler bei der Metadaten-MAC-Prüfung: {e}"));
+                        report
+                            .errors
+                            .push(format!("Fehler bei der Metadaten-MAC-Prüfung: {e}"));
                     }
                 }
             }
@@ -374,11 +374,13 @@ mod tests {
 
         // 2 Chunks schreiben
         let chunk0_data = b"Sample JPEG data header and pixels";
-        let (ct0, n0, t0) = encrypt_chunk(&dek, file.id, 0, chunk0_data, FORMAT_VERSION, 0).unwrap();
+        let (ct0, n0, t0) =
+            encrypt_chunk(&dek, file.id, 0, chunk0_data, FORMAT_VERSION, 0).unwrap();
         db.write_chunk(file.id, 0, 0, &n0, &t0, &ct0).unwrap();
 
         let chunk1_data = b"Additional payload data bytes";
-        let (ct1, n1, t1) = encrypt_chunk(&dek, file.id, 1, chunk1_data, FORMAT_VERSION, 0).unwrap();
+        let (ct1, n1, t1) =
+            encrypt_chunk(&dek, file.id, 1, chunk1_data, FORMAT_VERSION, 0).unwrap();
         db.write_chunk(file.id, 1, 0, &n1, &t1, &ct1).unwrap();
 
         db.update_node_size_and_time(

src/vfs.rs

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use std::time::{Duration, SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
 
-use std::path::Path;
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use bytes::{Buf, Bytes, BytesMut};
 use dav_server::{
@@ -15,6 +14,7 @@ use dav_server::{
     },
 };
 use futures_util::stream;
+use std::path::Path;
 use tracing::{debug, error, warn};
 use zeroize::{Zeroize, Zeroizing};
 
@@ -319,12 +319,11 @@ impl SanctumFile {
                 .next_chunk_generation(self.node_id, idx)
                 .unwrap_or(0);
             let (ciphertext, nonce, tag) =
-                encrypt_chunk(&self.dek, self.node_id, idx, data, self.format_version, gen).map_err(
+                encrypt_chunk(&self.dek, self.node_id, idx, data, self.format_version, gen)
-                    |e| {
+                    .map_err(|e| {
                         error!("Verschlüsselungsfehler beim Chunk-Flush: {e}");
                         FsError::GeneralFailure
-                    },
+                    })?;
-                )?;
 
             if let Err(e) = self.db.write_chunk_and_update_size(
                 self.node_id,
@@ -1404,7 +1403,10 @@ mod tests {
 
         assert!(is_leak_file_with_custom("audit.secret_log", &custom_rules));
         assert!(is_leak_file_with_custom("debug_dump.txt", &custom_rules));
-        assert!(is_leak_file_with_custom("app_temp_cache.dat", &custom_rules));
+        assert!(is_leak_file_with_custom(
+            "app_temp_cache.dat",
+            &custom_rules
+        ));
         assert!(is_leak_file_with_custom("custom_exact.bin", &custom_rules));
 
         // Normale Datei wird nicht blockiert

src/windows.rs

@@ -855,7 +855,9 @@ pub fn get_available_disk_space<P: AsRef<std::path::Path>>(path: P) -> Option<u6
         let dir = if p.is_dir() {
             p.to_path_buf()
         } else {
-            p.parent().map(|parent| parent.to_path_buf()).unwrap_or_else(|| p.to_path_buf())
+            p.parent()
+                .map(|parent| parent.to_path_buf())
+                .unwrap_or_else(|| p.to_path_buf())
         };
         let mut wide: Vec<u16> = dir.as_os_str().encode_wide().collect();
         wide.push(0);

tests/carrier_model_a_test.rs

@@ -792,13 +792,7 @@ fn test_m05_deniability_schema_equality_standard_vs_hidden() {
 
     let db_std = Database::open(&path_std).expect("Open std db");
     db_std
-        .init_schema(
+        .init_schema(&salt_std, &kdf_params, &wrapped_std, &nonce_std, &tag_std)
-            &salt_std,
-            &kdf_params,
-            &wrapped_std,
-            &nonce_std,
-            &tag_std,
-        )
         .expect("Init std schema");
     db_std.checkpoint().unwrap();
 
@@ -842,7 +836,8 @@ fn test_m05_deniability_schema_equality_standard_vs_hidden() {
     let conn_std = rusqlite::Connection::open(&path_std).unwrap();
     let conn_hidden = rusqlite::Connection::open(&path_hidden).unwrap();
 
-    let get_schema_elements = |conn: &rusqlite::Connection| -> Vec<(String, String, Option<String>)> {
+    let get_schema_elements =
+        |conn: &rusqlite::Connection| -> Vec<(String, String, Option<String>)> {
             let mut stmt = conn
                 .prepare(
                     "SELECT type, name, sql FROM sqlite_master 
@@ -872,8 +867,11 @@ fn test_m05_deniability_schema_equality_standard_vs_hidden() {
 
     // Spalten- und Typinformationen vergleichen
     for table in &["meta", "nodes", "chunks"] {
-        let get_table_info = |conn: &rusqlite::Connection| -> Vec<(i64, String, String, i64, Option<String>, i64)> {
+        let get_table_info =
-            let mut stmt = conn.prepare(&format!("PRAGMA table_info({});", table)).unwrap();
+            |conn: &rusqlite::Connection| -> Vec<(i64, String, String, i64, Option<String>, i64)> {
+                let mut stmt = conn
+                    .prepare(&format!("PRAGMA table_info({});", table))
+                    .unwrap();
                 let rows = stmt
                     .query_map([], |row| {
                         Ok((
@@ -925,4 +923,3 @@ fn test_m05_deniability_schema_equality_standard_vs_hidden() {
     let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path_std);
     let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path_hidden);
 }
-

tests/integration_test.rs

@@ -1798,10 +1798,7 @@ fn test_m02_release_profile_enables_overflow_checks() {
         .split("[profile.release]")
         .nth(1)
         .expect("Must have [profile.release] section");
-    let release_block = release_section
+    let release_block = release_section.split('[').next().unwrap_or(release_section);
-        .split('[')
-        .next()
-        .unwrap_or(release_section);
     assert!(
         release_block.contains("overflow-checks = true"),
         "M-02: [profile.release] must explicitly set overflow-checks = true to prevent integer overflow vulnerabilities"

tests/mount_security_test.rs

@@ -309,6 +309,3 @@ async fn test_z04_webdav_quota_report() {
     drop(db);
     let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&container_path);
 }
-
-
-

tests/sync_test.rs

@@ -1187,5 +1187,3 @@ fn test_s09_pull_backup_and_update_conflict_safety() {
 
     let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&temp_root);
 }
-
-

tests/untrusted_container_test.rs

@@ -704,9 +704,7 @@ fn test_k01_metadata_tampering_detected_by_verify() {
         .unwrap();
 
     // Knoten anlegen
-    let node = db
+    let node = db.create_node(1, "secret_financials.xlsx", false).unwrap();
-        .create_node(1, "secret_financials.xlsx", false)
-        .unwrap();
     db.update_node_size_and_time(node.id, 50000, 1000).unwrap();
     db.checkpoint().unwrap();
 
@@ -773,7 +771,8 @@ fn test_k01_metadata_tampering_detected_by_verify() {
 #[test]
 fn test_k01_upgrade_format_v2_to_v3() {
     let temp_dir = std::env::temp_dir();
-    let db_path: PathBuf = temp_dir.join(format!("test_k01_upgrade_{}.sanctum", std::process::id()));
+    let db_path: PathBuf =
+        temp_dir.join(format!("test_k01_upgrade_{}.sanctum", std::process::id()));
     if db_path.exists() {
         let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&db_path);
     }
@@ -996,5 +995,3 @@ async fn test_k02_chunk_replay_detected_by_vfs_and_crypto() {
 
     let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&db_path);
 }
-
-

tests/upgrade_security_test.rs

@@ -98,10 +98,7 @@ trusted comment: timestamp:1789750897\tfile:test_payload.txt\thashed\n\
     assert!(sig_line.starts_with("RU"));
     sig_line.replace_range(0..2, "RW");
 
-    let legacy_sig_text = format!(
+    let legacy_sig_text = format!("{}\n{}\n{}\n{}\n", lines[0], sig_line, lines[2], lines[3]);
-        "{}\n{}\n{}\n{}\n",
-        lines[0], sig_line, lines[2], lines[3]
-    );
 
     let res = verify_minisign_signature(payload, &legacy_sig_text, SANCTUM_RELEASE_PUBKEY);
     assert!(
@@ -194,5 +191,3 @@ zjZAS4uy1PH+0S9KQ0EU435lpBczU3lULyS5SkWf093iCEBc1ULiscwE5gWkEkex3ecPdRugopT+fKaZ
         "Weder Primär- noch Backup-Schlüssel dürfen manipulierte Nutzdaten akzeptieren"
     );
 }
-
-