use sanctum::crypto::{
    derive_kek, generate_dek, generate_salt, wrap_dek, KdfParams, MIN_MEMORY_COST_KIB,
    MIN_TIME_COST,
};
use sanctum::mount::is_loopback_host;
use sanctum::storage::Database;
use std::path::PathBuf;

#[test]
fn test_is_loopback_host_comprehensive() {
    // Gültige IPv4 Loopback Varianten
    assert!(is_loopback_host("127.0.0.1"));
    assert!(is_loopback_host("127.0.0.1:80"));
    assert!(is_loopback_host("127.0.0.1:8080"));
    assert!(is_loopback_host("127.0.0.1:65535"));

    // Gültige Hostname Loopback Varianten
    assert!(is_loopback_host("localhost"));
    assert!(is_loopback_host("localhost:80"));
    assert!(is_loopback_host("localhost:8443"));
    assert!(is_loopback_host("LOCALHOST"));
    assert!(is_loopback_host("LocalHost:9000"));

    // Gültige IPv6 Loopback Varianten
    assert!(is_loopback_host("[::1]"));
    assert!(is_loopback_host("[::1]:80"));
    assert!(is_loopback_host("[::1]:8443"));
    assert!(is_loopback_host("::1"));

    // DNS-Rebinding & Spoofing Angriffe (MÜSSEN abgewiesen werden)
    assert!(!is_loopback_host("127.0.0.1.attacker.com"));
    assert!(!is_loopback_host("localhost.attacker.com"));
    assert!(!is_loopback_host("localhost.evil.org:8080"));
    assert!(!is_loopback_host("notlocalhost"));
    assert!(!is_loopback_host("attacker.com"));
    assert!(!is_loopback_host("attacker.com:127001"));
    assert!(!is_loopback_host("192.168.1.1"));
    assert!(!is_loopback_host("10.0.0.1"));
    assert!(!is_loopback_host("0.0.0.0"));
    assert!(!is_loopback_host(""));
    assert!(!is_loopback_host("   "));
    assert!(!is_loopback_host("foo:bar:baz"));
}

#[test]
fn test_wal_and_shm_cleanup_on_close() {
    let temp_dir = std::env::temp_dir();
    let container_path: PathBuf =
        temp_dir.join(format!("test_wal_cleanup_{}.sanctum", std::process::id()));
    if container_path.exists() {
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&container_path);
    }

    let salt = generate_salt();
    let kdf_params = KdfParams {
        memory_cost: MIN_MEMORY_COST_KIB,
        time_cost: MIN_TIME_COST,
        parallelism: 1,
    };
    let kek = derive_kek("WalCleanupPassword2026!", &salt, &kdf_params).unwrap();
    let dek = generate_dek();
    let (wrapped_dek, nonce, tag) = wrap_dek(&kek, &dek).unwrap();

    let db = Database::open(&container_path).unwrap();
    db.init_schema(&salt, &kdf_params, &wrapped_dek, &nonce, &tag)
        .unwrap();

    // Erstelle Knoten, um Schreibaktivität im WAL zu erzeugen
    let _ = db.create_node(1, "test_file.txt", false).unwrap();
    db.checkpoint().unwrap();
    drop(db);

    // Bereinigungslogik (wie in mount.rs unmount) ausführen
    let base_os = container_path.as_os_str().to_os_string();
    let mut wal = base_os.clone();
    wal.push("-wal");
    let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&wal);
    let mut shm = base_os;
    shm.push("-shm");
    let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&shm);

    assert!(
        !PathBuf::from(wal).exists(),
        "WAL-Datei darf nach sauberem Unmount nicht zurückbleiben"
    );
    assert!(
        !PathBuf::from(shm).exists(),
        "SHM-Datei darf nach sauberem Unmount nicht zurückbleiben"
    );

    let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&container_path);
}

#[test]
fn test_mount_security_multi_auth_and_no_token_in_url() {
    use sanctum::mount::{check_basic_auth, check_token_header, uri_contains_token};

    let session_token = "4f8a12bc90de45f187a23456789abcde";
    let port = 8443;
    let remote_url = format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", port);

    // R-05 & SA-05: Die Remote-URL für Mount-Befehle darf niemals das Session-Token enthalten!
    assert!(
        !remote_url.contains(session_token),
        "Remote URL darf niemals das Session-Token enthalten"
    );

    // 1. Basic Auth Prüfung (Constant-Time)
    use base64::Engine;
    let auth_header = format!(
        "Basic {}",
        base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(format!("sanctum:{}", session_token))
    );
    assert!(check_basic_auth(&auth_header, session_token));

    let wrong_auth = format!(
        "Basic {}",
        base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode("sanctum:wrong_token_1234567890abcdef")
    );
    assert!(!check_basic_auth(&wrong_auth, session_token));

    // 2. Token Header Prüfung (Constant-Time)
    let mut headers = hyper::HeaderMap::new();
    headers.insert("X-Sanctum-Token", session_token.parse().unwrap());
    assert!(check_token_header(&headers, session_token));

    let mut wrong_headers = hyper::HeaderMap::new();
    wrong_headers.insert(
        "X-Sanctum-Token",
        "wrong_token_1234567890abcdef".parse().unwrap(),
    );
    assert!(!check_token_header(&wrong_headers, session_token));

    // 3. SA-05: Verifikation, dass Token in URI (Pfad oder Query) erkannt und strikt abgewiesen wird
    let uri_path: hyper::Uri = format!("http://127.0.0.1:8443/{}/test.txt", session_token)
        .parse()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        uri_contains_token(&uri_path, session_token),
        "Token im Pfad muss erkannt werden"
    );

    let uri_query: hyper::Uri = format!("http://127.0.0.1:8443/test.txt?token={}", session_token)
        .parse()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        uri_contains_token(&uri_query, session_token),
        "Token im Query-String muss erkannt werden"
    );

    let uri_clean: hyper::Uri = "http://127.0.0.1:8443/test.txt".parse().unwrap();
    assert!(
        !uri_contains_token(&uri_clean, session_token),
        "Saubere URI darf kein Token enthalten"
    );
}