Sanctum Release / Build & Release (Windows x86_64) (push) Waiting to run
- R-01: Bereinigung verbliebener Restbehauptungen in Doku und Code (LEGAL.md, README.md, QUICKSTART.md, main.rs, crypto/storage/recovery/verify.rs) - R-02: Lückenloser Carrier-Schutz in SanctumFs::copy (Quelle & Ziel) und sync (Pull-Skip & Push-Schutz) - R-03: Shared Dateinamen-Validierung (validate_node_name) in pathutil.rs, durchgesetzt in storage.rs und vfs.rs - R-04: Fail-closed Release-Packaging & obligatorische Minisign-Signatur in CI (.gitea/workflows/release.yaml) und Scripts - R-05: Session-Token Beseitigung im argv: In-Process Win32 WNetAddConnection2W/WNetCancelConnection2W, kein gio argv-Token, Multi-Auth HTTP Middleware (Basic Auth, X-Sanctum-Token, Path-Fallback) mit 401 WWW-Authenticate - R-06: Sofortiges Löschen von SANCTUM_RECOVERY_KEY aus der Prozessumgebung
116 lines
4.3 KiB
Rust
116 lines
4.3 KiB
Rust
use std::path::PathBuf;
|
|
use sanctum::crypto::{
|
|
derive_kek, generate_dek, generate_salt, wrap_dek, KdfParams, MIN_MEMORY_COST_KIB,
|
|
MIN_TIME_COST,
|
|
};
|
|
use sanctum::mount::is_loopback_host;
|
|
use sanctum::storage::Database;
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_is_loopback_host_comprehensive() {
|
|
// Gültige IPv4 Loopback Varianten
|
|
assert!(is_loopback_host("127.0.0.1"));
|
|
assert!(is_loopback_host("127.0.0.1:80"));
|
|
assert!(is_loopback_host("127.0.0.1:8080"));
|
|
assert!(is_loopback_host("127.0.0.1:65535"));
|
|
|
|
// Gültige Hostname Loopback Varianten
|
|
assert!(is_loopback_host("localhost"));
|
|
assert!(is_loopback_host("localhost:80"));
|
|
assert!(is_loopback_host("localhost:8443"));
|
|
assert!(is_loopback_host("LOCALHOST"));
|
|
assert!(is_loopback_host("LocalHost:9000"));
|
|
|
|
// Gültige IPv6 Loopback Varianten
|
|
assert!(is_loopback_host("[::1]"));
|
|
assert!(is_loopback_host("[::1]:80"));
|
|
assert!(is_loopback_host("[::1]:8443"));
|
|
assert!(is_loopback_host("::1"));
|
|
|
|
// DNS-Rebinding & Spoofing Angriffe (MÜSSEN abgewiesen werden)
|
|
assert!(!is_loopback_host("127.0.0.1.attacker.com"));
|
|
assert!(!is_loopback_host("localhost.attacker.com"));
|
|
assert!(!is_loopback_host("localhost.evil.org:8080"));
|
|
assert!(!is_loopback_host("notlocalhost"));
|
|
assert!(!is_loopback_host("attacker.com"));
|
|
assert!(!is_loopback_host("attacker.com:127001"));
|
|
assert!(!is_loopback_host("192.168.1.1"));
|
|
assert!(!is_loopback_host("10.0.0.1"));
|
|
assert!(!is_loopback_host("0.0.0.0"));
|
|
assert!(!is_loopback_host(""));
|
|
assert!(!is_loopback_host(" "));
|
|
assert!(!is_loopback_host("foo:bar:baz"));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_wal_and_shm_cleanup_on_close() {
|
|
let temp_dir = std::env::temp_dir();
|
|
let container_path: PathBuf = temp_dir.join(format!("test_wal_cleanup_{}.sanctum", std::process::id()));
|
|
if container_path.exists() {
|
|
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&container_path);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let salt = generate_salt();
|
|
let kdf_params = KdfParams {
|
|
memory_cost: MIN_MEMORY_COST_KIB,
|
|
time_cost: MIN_TIME_COST,
|
|
parallelism: 1,
|
|
};
|
|
let kek = derive_kek("WalCleanupPassword2026!", &salt, &kdf_params).unwrap();
|
|
let dek = generate_dek();
|
|
let (wrapped_dek, nonce, tag) = wrap_dek(&kek, &dek).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let db = Database::open(&container_path).unwrap();
|
|
db.init_schema(&salt, &kdf_params, &wrapped_dek, &nonce, &tag).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
// Erstelle Knoten, um Schreibaktivität im WAL zu erzeugen
|
|
let _ = db.create_node(1, "test_file.txt", false).unwrap();
|
|
db.checkpoint().unwrap();
|
|
drop(db);
|
|
|
|
// Bereinigungslogik (wie in mount.rs unmount) ausführen
|
|
let base_os = container_path.as_os_str().to_os_string();
|
|
let mut wal = base_os.clone();
|
|
wal.push("-wal");
|
|
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&wal);
|
|
let mut shm = base_os;
|
|
shm.push("-shm");
|
|
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&shm);
|
|
|
|
assert!(!PathBuf::from(wal).exists(), "WAL-Datei darf nach sauberem Unmount nicht zurückbleiben");
|
|
assert!(!PathBuf::from(shm).exists(), "SHM-Datei darf nach sauberem Unmount nicht zurückbleiben");
|
|
|
|
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&container_path);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_mount_security_multi_auth_and_no_token_in_url() {
|
|
use sanctum::mount::{check_basic_auth, check_token_header, strip_path_prefix};
|
|
|
|
let session_token = "4f8a12bc90de45f187a23456789abcde";
|
|
let port = 8443;
|
|
let remote_url = format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", port);
|
|
|
|
// R-05: Die Remote-URL für Mount-Befehle darf niemals das Session-Token enthalten!
|
|
assert!(!remote_url.contains(session_token), "Remote URL darf niemals das Session-Token enthalten");
|
|
|
|
// 1. Basic Auth Prüfung
|
|
use base64::Engine;
|
|
let auth_header = format!(
|
|
"Basic {}",
|
|
base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(format!("sanctum:{}", session_token))
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(check_basic_auth(&auth_header, session_token));
|
|
|
|
// 2. Token Header Prüfung
|
|
let mut headers = hyper::HeaderMap::new();
|
|
headers.insert("X-Sanctum-Token", session_token.parse().unwrap());
|
|
assert!(check_token_header(&headers, session_token));
|
|
|
|
// 3. Path-Prefix Fallback
|
|
let prefix = format!("/{}", session_token);
|
|
let uri: hyper::Uri = format!("http://127.0.0.1:8443/{}/test.txt", session_token).parse().unwrap();
|
|
let stripped = strip_path_prefix(&uri, &prefix).expect("Strip prefix");
|
|
assert_eq!(stripped.path(), "/test.txt");
|
|
}
|